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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Pharmaceutical policies have become paramount
in China and other countries of the Asia-Paciﬁc region
because of rapidly rising expenditures on drugs. The prob-
lems are especially acute in China because expenditures on
drugs are typically so large. This article intends to review
effects of the policy of drug expenditure containment with
primary reference to China, and it proposes some measures
to deal with rising pharmaceutical expenditures.
Methods: This article overviews the issues of pharmaceutical
pricing, reimbursement, and access in China, and there are a
number of policies or measures to control pharmaceutical
expenditures. Nevertheless, the effect of those policies of
containing drug expenditure is ambiguous so far, and some
policies have negative impacts to the manufacturers, provid-
ers, and patients. Some underlying reasons are identiﬁed.
First, the policy’s focus on health-care costs is, to some
extent, neglected. Second, the governance of the health sector,
including pharmaceutical sector, needs to be improved by
both the government and the market.
Results: This article proposes some suggestions to change
policies in drug pricing, reimbursement, and access, and
make policies more responsive to the main problem of rising
health-care expenditures rather than that of pharmaceutical
expenditures alone.
Conclusions: The policy suggestions include those of setting
the reasonable price for pharmaceuticals, instituting reason-
able incentives for all health decision-makers to encourage
efﬁcient use of pharmaceuticals and other health resources,
and making pharmaceutical markets more efﬁcient, either in
the demand or the supply side.
Keywords: access, China, pharmaceutical, pricing,
reimbursement.
Introduction
Asia-Paciﬁc countries are highly diverse. While some
are developed, others are developing. While some
countries are afﬂuent, others are poor. While some are
primarily urban, others are largely rural. Most devel-
oping countries in this region are in the process of
economic transition with regard to industrialization,
population shift, urbanization, and other dimensions.
It is clear that health needs and demands are changing
in the context of volatile circumstance [1]. Noncom-
municable diseases are increasingly dominant in health
care, but communicable diseases are still imposing
heavy burdens to those countries, including unﬁnished
missions of control of TB or malaria, and the emerging
targets of severe acquired respiratory syndrome
(SARS) and avian ﬂu [2].
In every country, increasing health expenditures
seem to be insufﬁcient compared to increasing health-
care needs and demands, and developing countries are
all seriously lacking funds [3]. As health expenditures
increase rapidly and health resources are limited, more
concern focuses on how to improve efﬁciency of avail-
able resources. Most countries are trying to contain
health-care costs, and one common strategy is to
control pharmaceutical expenditures.
This article reviews the effects of the policy of drug
price containment with primary reference to China,
and it proposes some measures to deal with rising
pharmaceutical expenditures. In view of the large
share of pharmaceutical expenditures in the Chinese
national health expenditure [4,5], we select China as a
special case in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.
The problems of pharmaceutical pricing, reimburse-
ment, and access are so broad that our article is an
overview of issues and priorities, rather than a full
analysis of any one policy option. We discuss policy
conﬂicts and opportunities that must be considered in
any subsequent policy recommendation.
The Role of Pharmaceuticals in
Health Systems
It is vital to consider the role of pharmaceuticals in
health systems before one attempts to control their
expenditures. In China, the share of pharmaceuticals
in total health expenditures, 50% to 62% [6], is much
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higher than the United States and the European coun-
tries. In the United States, the pharmaceutical share
has been remarkably stable between 10% and 11%
[7]. In European countries, the share is higher, between
15% and 25% [8].
Because drug expenditures are responsible for the
largest share of national health expenditures in China,
it is undoubtedly clear that the issue of pharmaceutical
cost containment is an especially important problem
for the Chinese health sector.
Pharmaceutical expenditures are determined by
price levels, consumption patterns, and their interac-
tions. The international experience suggests three ways
to contain pharmaceutical expenditures, including
price setting, patient utilization control, and changing
provider prescribing behavior [8]. China has under-
taken a number of measures to control pharmaceutical
expenditures, such as the use of drug formularies
and consumer cost-sharing in social health insurance
schemes for urban employees, capping the annual
growth rate of incomes of hospitals, controlling the
prices of pharmaceuticals, and regulating markups [9].
Nevertheless, the effect seems to be ambiguous. We
will review some policies and seek lessons.
Setting the Reasonable Price
for Pharmaceuticals
In China, The State Commission of Development and
Planning is responsible for setting the retail prices for
drugs. From 1998 to 2005, the central authority
reduced drug prices 18 times. To some extent, expected
effects were achieved; however, those price-cut drugs
experienced reduced levels of production by pharma-
ceutical companies, saw reduced levels of distribution
by wholesalers or retailers, were less often purchased
by hospitals, and were less often prescribed by doctors.
It seems to be more difﬁcult for patients to access those
reduced price drugs.
Reducing the price of pharmaceuticals will reduce
expenditures only if markets are sensitive to price. The
pharmaceutical market for Chinese hospitals and
clinics is not price sensitive because providers rely on
proﬁt from pharmaceutical sales to cover operating
deﬁcits. The situation is made worse because the
markup is higher for expensive, brand-name products
than it is for inexpensive domestic products. There-
fore, providers have an incentive to continue prescrib-
ing expensive products, even though they may be
unnecessary for particular patients.
Once the retail price is set at a low level, it will
disrupt the pharmaceutical distribution chain because
there is less overall markup to split among the steps.
The effect of a mandated price reduction may be to
reduce the number of levels in the distribution system,
and that would be good because the system lacks efﬁ-
ciency and transparency. There are approximately
17,000 drug wholesalers and 20,000 retailers in
China, most of which are very small.
The price of a pharmaceutical for a manufacturer is
determined by many factors. Some are supply side,
such as costs, and some are demand side, such as
quality of the drug, and market characteristics. If the
manufacturer cannot cover its production costs or
maintain its investment in R&D because of an admin-
istered price decision, it will cease the production of a
drug. For example, cyclophosphamide is a basic drug
for cancer treatment, and its price was 4 yuan per
dosage, but it has disappeared from the market for a
while. Doctors have to use ifosfamide as a replace-
ment, and patients are complaining about its high price
of 200 yuan per dosage. The reason why the previous
drug dropped out of the market is that the manufac-
turers cannot derive any proﬁt from it. There are many
similar cases in China, in which cheap, effective, and
old drugs are vanishing.
The common means by which a manufacturer stops
producing an old, low-priced drug is to develop instead
a similar drug with “a little change” and apply for its
approval as a new drug. The new drug is likely to sell for
a higher price. The Chinese idiom called this phenom-
enon “the same old stuff with a new label.” TheChinese
Finance magazine published a report on this subject in
2005, and it revealed that the State Drug Administra-
tion Authority accepted about 10,000 new drug appli-
cations, and none of them was really a new molecule.
All of them represented only a small change in dosage,
route of administration, usage, or packaging [10].
There is also an important role for health insurers,
who now are passive as to treatment decisions by
providers. If insurers either set practice guidelines or
protocols or pay providers according to a least-cost
protocol, providers would be forced to buy only cost-
effective inputs. This is the approach used by managed
care programs in the United States, and has been effec-
tive in achieving efﬁciencies in care. A variation on this
idea is that consumers might have more choice on the
treatment option if they are willing to pay for more
expensive inputs. “Tiered formulary” health plans in
the United States offer physicians and patients a choice
in drug therapy, with the product costing the least to
the health plan (usually, the generic) offered to patients
at a very low price.
Establishing Incentives for Efﬁcient
Pharmaceutical Utilization
Besides pharmaceutical price, pharmaceutical quantity
is also an important factor contributing to expendi-
ture. Meng et al. examined the impact of drug price
cutting policy on the containment of hospital drug
expenditures by a pretest and post-test design in two
public hospitals in China [9]. The authors found that
drug expenditures for all patients still increased rapidly
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in two hospitals after implementation of the pricing
policy. They concluded that control of retail prices,
implemented in isolation, was not effective in contain-
ing hospital drug expenditures in these two Chinese
hospitals; utilization, more than price, determined the
drug expenditures. How can we encourage providers
to prescribe efﬁcient pharmaceutical utilization? The
main strategy might be the use of appropriate reim-
bursement mechanisms, and a prospective payment
system that could “internalize” drug expenditures and
utilization.
There must be clarity as to the health system’s goal
for change: containing pharmaceutical expenditures
or containing overall health-care costs. In reality, the
issue is not merely containing pharmaceutical costs,
but rather, containing overall health-care costs and
improving outcomes. Although it seems obvious,
health policymakers frequently fail to notice the inter-
relationships among inputs when proposals are made
to restrict the use of one or another health inputs,
assuming that one input can be reduced without affect-
ing the use of other inputs. In the United States, for
example, the use of pharmaceuticals was arbitrarily
reduced by one state in an attempt to reduce drug
costs, and only later was it observed that hospital and
nursing home admissions rose to compensate for the
restriction on ambulatory drug availability. The
increase in health services utilization cost 17 times
more than the savings in drug costs [11]. One cannot
minimize the use of one input without seeing the
impact on other inputs. The goal of health system cost
containment must be to consider overall health expen-
ditures and not individual component budgets, and
only then can health system efﬁciency be increased.
For pharmaceutical markets to work efﬁciently,
incentives must exist to encourage cost-efﬁciency, not
only in the pharmaceutical market, but more broadly
across all health services. As Towse states [12],
“. . . the emphasis should be on measures that achieve
efﬁcient health care rather than the containment of
drug spending.”
An example of incentives that are not aligned with
overall health system efﬁciency is the ﬁnancial role of
pharmaceutical expenditures in hospitals in China. In
China, reimbursement for medical care services is
usually below costs, leading providers to be in deﬁcit.
To overcome budget shortfalls, providers are able to
charge substantial premiums to the cost of drugs,
meaning that the drugs contribute to the overall prof-
itability of the institutions [13]. This incentive leads
physicians and administrators to prescribe more drugs
than would be optimal for patients and to prescribe
drugs that produce the greatest proﬁt.
In addition, under the fee-for-service mechanism,
the providers have the tendency to maximize proﬁt: the
more services, the more proﬁts. Of course, the provid-
ers induce demand for health care, including high-
technology services, and new pharmaceuticals, which
is sometimes not necessary. This cost-driving reim-
bursement mechanism is incompatible with the goal of
containing health-care costs.
The incentives in a system that pays providers
according to their costs of production raise costs
without necessarily improving quality. There are many
reimbursement models by which providers are paid
according to their output rather than the costs of their
inputs. One is the British attempt to pay providers with
a kind of global capitation budget that includes the
costs of pharmaceuticals and other inputs. Another is
the American system of Diagnostic Related Group hos-
pital reimbursement, which pays hospitals according
to diagnosis of the patient and punishes the hospital if
they treat the patient inadequately. The successful
experiences of managed care in the United States are
mostly based on its reimbursement mechanisms. Fee-
for-service reimbursement encourages more services,
but capitation favors appropriate services. All of these
systems “internalize” production decisions by making
the provider responsible for the costs of inputs. These
reimbursement models would reduce the incentive in
Chinese hospitals to use high-cost inputs. We suggest
that prospective reimbursement mechanisms be used
to trigger the rational incentives to the hospital and the
physician. Reform of the reimbursement mechanism
plays the key role of changing incentives to the pro-
viders. The incentives therefore are for the provider to
be more careful and frugal in the use of all health
resources, and to be responsible for all costs of differ-
ent forms of health care, including drugs. The pro-
spective reimbursement mechanism can be a good
countermeasure to solve existing problems in the
Chinese health-care system, such as overprescription,
abuse of high technology services, cost shifting, and so
forth. Therefore, it is also a good measure to curb the
escalating health-care costs, including drugs.
Increasing Competition in the Demand
for Pharmaceuticals
How competitive is the market for pharmaceuticals
among decision-makers? For the demand for pharma-
ceuticals to be efﬁcient, decision-makers must be aware
of alternative products, including their attributes and
their costs. In health-care delivery, patients are increas-
ingly involved in decision-making, and they are
increasingly informed about diseases and drugs. Two
countries in the Paciﬁc Rim, the United States and New
Zealand, have expanded the scope of drug decision-
making to include consumers, through direct-to-
consumer (DTC) advertising [14]. Although some see
DTC advertising as abruptly changing the nature of
the patient–physician relationship, others see it more
as a continuation of the public’s quest for more infor-
mation about health care generally, and new technolo-
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gies in particular. Defenders of DTC advertising note
that the general public is keenly aware of health issues
and therapeutic alternatives from numerous TV pro-
grams, newspaper coverage, and magazines and books
on health issues. Added to this is a general attitude on
the part of patients in the United States, in particular,
seeking a greater role in medical decision-making.
Economists describe the relationship between a
relatively well-informed expert and a less-informed
consumer as an “agency” relationship [15]. How well
does this agency relationship work? One issue is that
the relationship is more complex than originally
described. First of all, there are at least two dimensions
to therapeutic choice: efﬁcacy and cost. But even “efﬁ-
cacy” contains at least two dimensions: direct effect
and side effects, or safety. Many therapies in use today
entail risks of substantial side effects. Often patients
are more concerned about the severity of side effects
than physicians had assumed and so physicians must
alter therapeutic decisions to account for patient pref-
erences. Another dimension to the agency relationship
is cost. When drugs were nearly always inexpensive,
cost was not a serious issue, but today many drugs are
extremely expensive and insurance coverage is not
complete.
Today there is relatively little research on how phy-
sicians and patients view the agency relationship
[16,17]. Some patients indicate that they would like
their physicians to base drug choice solely upon efﬁ-
cacy criteria. Other patients, when asked about their
relative ranking of outcome quality and cost, will reply
that they are primarily concerned about cost, as long
as the drugs are close to one another in terms of
efﬁcacy. Still other patients suggest that they would
like their physician (agent) to present alternatives (in
terms of efﬁcacy and cost) and that they, themselves,
would like to chose the most preferable alternative.
The agency relationship assumes that physicians (and
perhaps patients) need to know the therapeutic efﬁcacy
and cost of drug alternatives. This is highly problem-
atic today.
There is an emerging need for more accurate and
unbiased information for physicians and patients.
Because this information could be available to the
public, it is a kind of public good and must be
government-provided. Such information is also related
to the development of the academic, such as evidence-
based medicine, health technology assessment, and
pharmacoeconomic and outcome research.
Increasing Competition in the Supply
of Pharmaceuticals
Competition in the supply of pharmaceuticals has two
dimensions: drug availability and ﬁnancial access. An
analysis comparing drug approval lags in China and
the United States was done for the 15 top-selling drugs
in the United States in 2003 to look at the competition
in the drug market. Following the methodology of
Schweitzer et al. [18], the month of a drug’s approval
in the ﬁrst country starts the “approval lag clock.” The
number of months before the second country approves
the drug is noted. A lag approval of greater than
48 months is counted as “not approved,” because it is
assumed that the therapeutic contribution of a new
product occurs only during this 4-year period. After
48 months we assume that other drugs will be
approved that will compete with the ﬁrst drug, and
continued approval delay will have little marginal
therapeutic impact. If a drug is approved within
48 months of the ﬁrst country’s approval, the number
of months of approval (out of 48) is made a proportion
of the maximum availability (48 months).
The analysis of our results is shown in Table 1. The
ﬁndings were that drugs were approved in China con-
sistently later than in the United States, and many of
Table 1 Lag behind of drug approval between China and the United States
Drug
Approval date
in the United States
Approval date
in China
China
lag (mo)
United States
availability (%)
China
availability (%)
Lipitor December 1996 May 2000 41 100 14
Prevacid May 1995 November 2001 78 100 0
Zocor December 1991 June 1999 90 100 0
Nexium February 2001 October 2002 20 100 57
Zoloft December 1991 August 2001 117 100 0
Advair diskus August 2000 June 2000 -2 97 100
Effexor XR October 1997 June 2000 33 100 32
Plavix November 1997 January 2001 39 100 19
Celebrex December 1998 August 2000 20 100 58
Neurontin December 1993 May 2002 101 100 0
Protonix February 2000 April 2001 14 100 70
Norvasc July 1992 June 1999 84 100 0
Zyprexa September 1996 January 2002 64 100 0
Singulair February 1998 December 1999 23 100 52
Ambien December 1992 December 1999 85 100 0
Average 100 27
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the lags were long. The average availability index is
only 27%, compared to the United States.
A more restricted array of approved drugs for
physicians and patients to choose from decreases the
competitiveness of supply side of the pharmaceutical
market. With fewer drug alternatives available, physi-
cians have fewer therapeutic options from which to
choose. In some markets, such as antidepressants,
clinical outcomes tend to vary widely among patients,
and it is not unusual for a physician to try several
drugs for a patient before ﬁnding one that works best
for a particular patient. Second, new products, even if
similar to existing drugs, have some advantages, such
as greater convenience or fewer side effects. For some
patients, these “secondary” beneﬁts may be of small
value, but for other patients, they are extremely impor-
tant. The more drugs in the market, the more down-
ward price pressure there is on existing drugs, so that
even patients who do not use other new drugs will
beneﬁt from their availability.
In some cases, countries may be slow to approve new
drugs because they feel that new products are likely to
be less cost-effective than older drugs, and there is an
assumption that hesitancy in approving new drugs may
lead to cost savings. Studies in the United States have
suggested that this assumption is largely incorrect, with
new drugs saving more in total health-care costs than
the increase in direct drug costs that new products often
entail. Lichtenberg found strong evidence to support
the hypothesis that the replacement of older drugs by
new drugs resulted in reductions in total medical expen-
ditures, and a reduction in the age of drugs utilized
reduces nondrug expenditure 7.2 times as much as it
increases drug expenditure [19].
Conclusions
We have shown a number of cases in which pharma-
ceutical expenditures are related to the competitive-
ness of the market for pharmaceuticals, either on the
demand or the supply side. We have shown that some
programs that are generally accepted as useful
(including ﬁnancial responsibility by physicians for
the cost of drugs) can actually have perverse effects on
health system efﬁciency because of the incentives that
are created. Perhaps the most important lesson of all
that can be derived from this article is that pharma-
ceutical cost containment may not be the optimal
objective of health planners at all because pharmaceu-
ticals are only one of many inputs into the health
production function, and pharmaceutical cost con-
tainment may be inconsistent with overall health
system efﬁciency, so that great care must be exercised
when choosing health policy that will affect pharma-
ceutical markets.
To contain health-care costs in a reasonable range,
policy recommendation are both regulatory and
market-based. With market failure, it can be addressed
either with regulations to improve the functions of
markets or regulations to replace the market. Chang-
ing to a prospective reimbursement system will
improve the functions of markets for hospital inputs
because costs and efﬁcacy of inputs will be the deter-
minants of what is purchased, not merely proﬁt for
the hospital. But improving hospital reimbursement so
that costs are covered (so that hospitals do not have to
cover deﬁcits by buying expensive pharmaceuticals) is
also a regulatory step because this is payment by gov-
ernment or the third payer—insurance.
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